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Long Brent, Short WTI: The Case for Washington Keeping Oil at Home

The emergency reserve is nearly spent, diesel stocks are at a 23-year low, and the White House has already floated a fuel export ban. If the US restricts exports, the gap between global and American oil prices should blow out. Here is the case, and what would prove it wrong.

There are two oil prices that matter. Brent is the global price, set by crude that moves by tanker from the North Sea to anywhere in the world. WTI is the American price, set at a pipeline hub in Cushing, Oklahoma. Normally the gap between them is small, roughly the cost of shipping US crude to the Gulf Coast and across the ocean, about $3 to $5 a barrel.

That gap only stays small because America can export. My position is that the gap is about to be tested, because the political pressure to stop or limit those exports is building faster than most people expect. I am long Brent and short WTI. This piece explains why, and what would make me wrong.

How an export restriction moves the spread

US crude exports exist to arbitrage the two prices. When WTI is cheap relative to Brent, traders buy American barrels and ship them abroad until the gap closes. Take the exports away and that arbitrage disappears:

  • WTI falls. Crude that would have left the Gulf Coast has to be absorbed at home, by refiners that are already running flat out and that are built to process heavier oil than the US produces. A domestic glut forms.
  • Brent rises. The rest of the world loses American supply. In April the US exported a record 5.6 million barrels a day of crude, plus record volumes of fuel. That supply would have to be replaced from somewhere else in a market that is already tight.

We have seen what a trapped American market looks like. From 1975 to 2015, US crude exports were largely banned. In 2011, when pipelines out of Cushing were overwhelmed, WTI traded more than $25 a barrel below Brent. The gap only closed for good after Congress lifted the ban in December 2015.

Why the pressure is building

1. The emergency reserve is nearly gone. The government’s first tool against high prices is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. It has been used. The reserve held 282 million barrels at the end of October, down about 133 million barrels (32%) since March and the lowest since October 1982. Congress has set a floor of roughly 252 million barrels. There is very little left to release. When the cheap tool is used up, governments reach for the expensive one.

2. Fuel is short where voters feel it. Diesel and heating oil inventories fell to 99.3 million barrels at the end of October, the lowest since May 2003 and 13% below the five-year average. Diesel hit a record $6.53 a gallon on September 22. Gasoline is around $4.15–4.30, up about 40% from a year ago, even as the US exports record volumes of the same fuels. That contrast, record exports and record prices at the same time, is exactly the kind of fact that turns into legislation.

3. The White House has already said it out loud. In September, with diesel at a record, President Trump said of fuel exports, “let’s not send out the diesel,” and then said the administration was considering a diesel export ban “very seriously.” His advisers were reported to be analysing a short-term ban. It was not implemented, but the idea has been raised at the highest level, and markets remember it.

4. This is the third time this year. In March, rumours of restrictions were strong enough that an administration official had to state that “oil and gas export restrictions are not under consideration.” Goldman Sachs noted at the time that the market had been pricing in the risk, which helped keep WTI below Brent. In August, reports surfaced again and a spokesperson again denied any plan. Each denial came only after the idea was being taken seriously. As one energy writer put it in August, nothing is true until it is officially denied.

5. The politics just changed. Democrats won a majority in the House in last week’s midterms, in an election where fuel prices were a central issue. The new Congress sits on January 3. The idea of keeping American fuel at home has populist appeal in both parties. A president with approval in the low 30s and a Congress looking for a visible win on prices is a combination that makes intervention more likely, not less.

Why now, after the spread has narrowed

The spread has already moved a lot this year. It hit its widest level in more than a decade in March, at over $15, as the Iran war began and exports surged. It was still $14.12 on October 27. Since then, talk of de-escalation with Iran has cut it in half: on November 9 Brent was $96.91 and WTI $89.85, a gap of $7.06, approaching its pre-war range of $3 to $5.

That is why I think the timing is reasonable. The market is now pricing a return to normal: peace holds, exports flow, and the gap closes. It is pricing very little for policy risk. Yet the conditions that produced three rounds of export-ban talk this year (an empty reserve, scarce diesel, high prices) are all still in place. If de-escalation holds, the spread might fall another $2–4 to its old range. If Washington restricts exports, history says it can go to $15, $20 or more.

Even a narrower measure would help the position. A diesel-only export ban would force refiners to cut crude runs (S&P Global estimated by nearly 1.9 million barrels a day), leaving more American crude with nowhere to go but the export market, which would itself need a wider discount to clear.

The case against

I take the other side seriously, because it has been right every time so far this year:

  • The administration keeps saying no. Officials have denied plans to restrict crude exports twice, and the diesel ban was floated, not enacted. The oil industry has real political weight, and producers would lose billions from a domestic glut.
  • A crude ban would hurt the people it targets. US refineries need heavier crude than American shale produces, so a crude export ban would not lower fuel prices much. It would mostly punish producers. Columbia University’s energy centre argued in March that restrictions “would likely backfire,” and that is a strong argument against doing it.
  • Peace would take the air out of the trade. If an Iran deal reopens the Strait of Hormuz fully, global supply recovers. J.P. Morgan estimates the market was already in a surplus of more than 1 million barrels a day in October. In that world, Brent falls faster than WTI and the spread returns to $3–5.
  • The election is over. Much of the pressure for a quick fix was about November 3. That deadline has passed, and the next big one is two years away.
  • The spread can invert. On April 1, WTI briefly traded above Brent during a squeeze. A spread trade is not a one-way bet.

What would change my mind

  • A durable Iran agreement and a full reopening of Hormuz, with diesel stocks rebuilding toward their five-year average.
  • The reserve being refilled, or a credible plan to do so, which would give the government a tool other than export curbs.
  • A clear, repeated statement from the administration and the new congressional leadership ruling out export restrictions of any kind, including fuels.
  • The spread back inside $4 with no change in the policy backdrop, at which point the trade has done what peace alone can do and the policy option is all that is left.

Where I come out

This is a trade on politics as much as on oil. I am not predicting that the US will ban crude exports outright. I am saying that an empty emergency reserve, scarce diesel, record exports and an angry electorate make some form of export restriction a real possibility, and that the spread between Brent and WTI is close to pricing it at zero. I size it as a hedge against a policy shock rather than a core position, and I will cut it if the backdrop changes.

A note on how I hold it: through two funds, one that tracks Brent futures and one that returns twice the inverse of WTI futures daily. Because the inverse fund is leveraged and resets every day, the pair is not a pure spread. As sized, it is net short oil (the inverse fund’s doubled exposure outweighs the Brent fund), so a broad oil rally without a widening spread would cost me money, and holding a daily-reset fund for months adds drag in choppy markets.

This article is for information only and is not investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security, commodity or derivative. It reflects public information as of November 10, 2026. The author holds this position through BNO (Brent oil futures) and SCO (2x inverse WTI futures), and shares in US pipeline companies (Kinder Morgan, Williams). Views are the author's own and do not represent any current or former employer.

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